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Algorithmic impact assessments under the
GDPR: producing multi-layered explanations
Margot E. Kaminski and Gianclaudio Malgieri*

 Policymakers, scholars, and commentators are
increasingly concerned with the risks of using
algorithms for profiling and automated decisionmaking.
 This article addresses how a Data Protection
Impact Assessment (DPIA), applied as an algorithmic impact assessment (AIA), links the two
faces of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) approach to algorithmic accountability:
individual rights and systemic governance.
 We propose that AIAs simultaneously provide
systemic governance of algorithmic decisionmaking and serve as an important ‘suitable
safeguard’ (Article 22) of individual rights.
 As a nexus between the GDPR’s two approaches
to algorithmic accountability, DPIAs have a heretofore unexplored link to individual transparency
rights.
 Our examination of DPIAs suggests that the current focus on the right to explanation is far too
narrow. We call, instead, for data controllers
to consciously use the mandatory DPIA process
to produce what we call ‘multi-layered explanations’ of algorithmic systems.

Introduction
To date, the discussion of the GDPR’s regulation of algorithmic accountability has largely focused on whether
there is an individual right to explanation of an
*Gianclaudio Malgieri, Augmented Law Institute, EDHEC Business School,
Lille, France. E-mail: gianclaudio.malgieri@edhec.edu; gianclaudio.malgieri@
gmail.com. The authors, in alphabetical order, have contributed equally to
this work. This work was funded under Fullbright Schuman Program [to
Kaminski], and EU Horizon 2020 Project PANELFIT, Grant Agreement n.
788039. No conflict of interest to declare.

algorithmic decision. Only more recently have legal
scholars begun to focus on the GDPR’s systemic accountability tools.1
Impact assessments have received particular attention, on both sides of the Atlantic, as a tool for algorithmic accountability. This article aims to address how a
Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) (Article 35)
links the GDPR’s two approaches to algorithmic accountability—individual rights and systemic governance—and potentially leads to more accountable and
explainable algorithms. Examining the GDPR’s approach to impact assessments suggests that the scholarship has been getting explanations wrong. Algorithmic
explanations should not be understood as static statements but as a circular and multi-layered process. The
literature has largely to date focused on what information goes to whom and when; we argue that the impact
assessment process plays a crucial role in connecting internal company heuristics and risk mitigation to
outward-facing rights and in forming the substance of
several different kinds of explanations.
We begin by introducing the algorithmic accountability tools in the GDPR (section ‘Algorithmic accountability in the GDPR’). In section ‘Individual rights
in the GDPR and the multi-layered explanation’, we explore the individual rights of data subjects as regards
1

This article originally builds on and further develops the research conducted in preparation for Margot E Kaminski and Gianclaudio Malgieri,
‘Multi-Layered Explanations from Algorithmic Impact Assessments in
the GDPR’ in Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness,
Accountability, and Transparency, FAT* ’20 (Barcelona, Spain:
Association for Computing Machinery 2020), 68–79, https://doi.org/10.
1145/3351095.3372875.
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 This concept of multi-layered explanations not
only more accurately describes what the GDPR is
attempting to do, but also normatively fills potential gaps between the GDPR’s two approaches
to algorithmic accountability.
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algorithmic decisions. In section ‘Collaborative governance in the GDPR’, we explain the GDPR’s collaborative governance of algorithms. In section ‘The DPIA as
an algorithmic impact assessment’, we explain the
requirements of the DPIA under the GDPR. In section
‘A model algorithmic impact assessment’, we discuss
the broader literature on Impact Assessments and how
our interpretation of the GDPR’s impact assessment requirement in fact leads to a better, more complex understanding of the GDPR’s explanations of algorithmic
decision-making than a focus on Article 22 alone. We
close by calling for what we call a multi-layered approach to explanations, stemming from the impact assessment process.
As a methodological disclaimer: this article gives a
relatively large amount of attention to the opinions and
guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party, now the
European Data Protection Board (EDPB), an advisory
body consisting of national Data Protection Authorities.
We are aware that these guidelines are not binding and
cannot be considered to be the only possible interpretation of the GDPR. However, the GDPR (at Article 70)
states that the EDPB is required to issue opinions,
guidelines, and recommendations in order to ensure the
consistent application of the GDPR. Accordingly, the
interpretational activity of the EDPB is not only influential for commentators, but also for the activity of national Data Protection Authorities. Moreover, we
understand such opinions and guidelines to be an essential component of the GDPR’s regulatory approach, discussed further below. That approach—referred to in
scholarship as ‘collaborative governance’ or ‘new governance’—often entails broad or vague binding textual
requirements, clarified over time in regulatory guidance
or industry best practices or back-and-forth between
regulated companies and regulators. To dismiss EDPB
guidelines and opinions as non-binding ‘soft law’ is to
overlook the central role this softer law serves in the design of the GDPR as a regulatory system.

The GDPR has significant implications for algorithmic
decision-making. At first, the legal debate focused on
whether the GDPR created an individual right to an explanation of an individual algorithmic decision.2
Subsequent legal analysis, however, began to focus
instead on other accountability tools,3 required either in
the text of the GDPR, or in its Recitals, or in guidelines
issued by the Article 29 Working Party (now the
EDPB).4These tools include third-party auditing,
the appointment of Data Protection Officers
(DPOs)(Article 37), and the requirement of DPIAs
(Article 35) under certain circumstances.
As one of us has argued at length elsewhere, the
GDPR establishes a two-pronged approach to algorithmic accountability. It combines a series of individual
rights (Articles 12–23) with a systemic governance regime overseen by regulators, targeted at more comprehensive oversight over the algorithm and the people
around it (Articles 24–43 and throughout). These two
systems interact and overlap. An individual right is often also a company’s duty. But even if individuals (data
subjects) fail to invoke their rights, companies (data
controllers) have significant obligations—both procedural and substantive—under the GDPR.5
For example, in the algorithmic governance context,
a data subject has a right to contest an individual algorithmic decision (Article 22), to receive notice of solely
automated decision-making (ADM) (Article 13), and to
request access to ‘meaningful information about the
logic involved’ (Article 15). Should this fail to invoke
any of these rights, however, the GDPR still puts in
place significant obligations on data controllers using
ADM, whether that decision-making involves a human
or not.6 The GDPR requires an array of systemic accountability tools, including third-party auditing, the
appointment of DPOs (Article 37), and DPIAs (Article
35). These obligations arise from the text of the law, in

2

3

4
5

6

Antoni Roig, ‘Safeguards for the Right Not to Be Subject to a Decision
Based Solely on Automated Processing (Article 22 GDPR)’ (2018) 8(3)
European Journal of Law and Technology <http://ejlt.org/article/view/
570> accessed 8 October 2020; Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave
to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the
Remedy You Are Looking For’ (2017) 16(1) Duke Law & Technology
Review 18; Bryan Casey, Ashkon Farhangi and Roland Vogl, ‘Rethinking
Explainable Machines: The GDPR’s ‘Right to Explanation’ Debate and
the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise’ (2018) 34 (2019) Berkeley
Technology Law Journal.
Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4) 29.
Margot E Kaminski, ‘Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s
Approach to Algorithmic Accountability’ (2019) 92(6) Southern
California Law Review; Kaminski (n 2).
Edwards and Veale (n 3) 74–80.
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Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the
General Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7(2) International Data
Privacy Law 76; Gianclaudio Malgieri and Giovanni Comandé, ‘Why a
Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the General
Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7(4) International Data Privacy Law
243; B Goodman and S Flaxman, ‘EU Regulations on Algorithmic
Decision-Making and a ‘Right to Explanation’ (2016) <http://arxiv.org/
abs/1606.08813> accessed 30 June 2020; A Selbst and J Powles,
‘Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation’ (2017) 7(4)
International Data Privacy Law 233; Maja Brkan, ‘Do Algorithms Rule
the World? Algorithmic Decision-Making and Data Protection in the
Framework of the GDPR and Beyond’ (2019) International Journal of
Law and Information Technology <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eay017>
accessed 8 October 2020; Margot E Kaminski, ‘The Right to Explanation,
Explained’ (2019) 34(1) Berkeley Technology Law Journal <https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract¼3196985> accessed 8 October 2020.

Algorithmic accountability in the GDPR
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Individual rights in the GDPR and the
multi-layered explanation
The GDPR gives individuals several important rights
with respect to algorithmic decision-making. The
GDPR contains both general data protection rights
7

8

9
10

Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4). See Michael Veale and Lilian
Edwards, ‘Clarity, Surprises, and Further Questions in the Article 29
Working Party Draft Guidance on Automated Decision-Making and
Profiling’ (2018) 34(2) Computer Law & Security Review 398.
See Jody Freeman, ‘The Private Role in the Public Governance’ (2000) 75
New York University Law Review 543; K Bamberger, ‘Regulation as
Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the
Administrative State’ (2006) 56Duke Law Journal 377.
Kaminski (n 5) 28.
Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Enslaving the Algorithm: From a
‘Right to an Explanation’ to a ‘Right to Better Decisions’?’ (2018) 16(3)
IEEE Security & Privacy 46.
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(such as notification rights, access rights, rectification
rights, and the right to restrict processing) and rights
specific to profiling (such as the right to object), which
also apply to algorithmic decision-making.10 On top of
this, the GDPR establishes rights specific to algorithmic
decision-making, which include: a right to be notified
of solely ADM (Articles 13, 14); a right of both notification and access to meaningful information about the
logic involved (Articles 13, 14, 15); a right to be informed of the significance of and envisaged effects of
solely ADM (Articles 13, 14, 15); and a right not to be
subject to solely automated decision making (Article
22), with safeguards and restraints for the limited cases
in which ADM is permitted. Those safeguards include,
but are not limited to, a right to contest a decision, to
express one’s point of view, and to human intervention
(Article 22).
We do not intend to revisit the legal debate over
these rights in detail here, but an overview may be useful. As mentioned, discussion of these individual rights
has largely focused on whether or not—or really, how—
solely ADM must be explained to individuals. As Selbst
and Powles point out, it is disingenuous to say that
there is no right to an explanation in the GDPR; the
GDPR’s text clearly requires companies to explain at
least ‘meaningful information about the logic involved’
in ADM, in addition to its significance and envisioned
effects (Articles 13, 14, 15).11 What this information
constitutes in practice, however, has been the subject of
hot debate, including whether it is a system-wide
(model-wide) explanation or specific to individual decisions, and what depth of explanation is required.12
The core debate has primarily focused on whether or
not Article 22 creates an ex post right to explanation of
an individual decision made by an automated system.13
Our view, discussed at length by each of us elsewhere, is
that it does.14 Automated decisions with significant
effects must be made ‘legible’ to individuals, in the sense
that individuals must be able to understand enough
about the decision-making process to be able to invoke
their other rights under the GDPR, including the right
to contest a decision.15 Several of the Member States
11
12
13

14
15

Selbst and Powles (n 2).
Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi (n 2) 78; Malgieri and Comandé (n 2)
244; Selbst and Powles (n 2) 240–41.
Brkan (n 2); Stefanie Hänold, ‘Profiling and Automated DecisionMaking: Legal Implications and Shortcomings’ in Marcelo Corrales,
Mark Fenwick and Nikolaus Forgó (eds), Robotics, AI and the Future of
Law, Perspectives in Law, Business and Innovation (Singapore: Springer
Singapore 2018), 123–53, See also Edwards and Veale (n 3) passim.
Malgieri and Comandé (n 2); Kaminski (n 2).
Malgieri and Comandé, ibid 250.
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accompanying Recitals, and in the Guidelines on
Automated Individual Decision-making and Profiling
(‘Guidelines on ADM’) released in October 2017 and revised in February 2018 by the Article 29 Working Party
(now the EDPB).7
It is also crucial to understand the mode through
which the GDPR governs. The GDPR largely governs—
both in the sense of coming up with the substance of
data controllers’ duties, and in the sense of monitoring
compliance—through an approach known in the legal
literature as ‘collaborative governance’: the use of public–private partnerships.8 This form of regulatory design
has alternatively been referred to as ‘new governance’,
‘co-governance’, partial delegation to the private sector,
and ‘meta-regulation’. Rather than create strict topdown rules enforced by the government, the government works with both regulated industries and with
third parties to come up with the substance of, and enforce, regulations. Importantly, collaborative governance is not equivalent to self-regulation; the
government still has an important, even central, role to
serve.
Because the GDPR effectively outsources many governance decisions to private companies, accountability
takes on added significance. Accountability in the
GDPR is not just about protecting individual rights. It
is about ensuring that this process of co-governing with
private parties receives appropriate input and oversight
from the public, from civil society, and from both expert and affected third parties.9
With this background in mind, the next two sections
of this article go into more detail on both the individual
rights and systemic governance elements of the GDPR’s
approach to algorithmic accountability, before turning
to the role of the DPIA in linking the two facets.
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19

Gianclaudio Malgieri, ‘Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member
States: The Right to Explanation and Other “Suitable Safeguards” in the
National Legislations’ (2019) Computer Law & Security Review 105327
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2019.05.002> accessed 8 October 2020.
See in particular the cases of French and Hungarian laws that provide
more explicit explanation of individual decisions taken (based on criteria
and methods used in algorithmic processing).
Karthikeyan Natesan Ramamurthy and others, ‘Model Agnostic
Multilevel Explanations’ (12 March 2020) <https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.
06005v1> accessed 8 October 2020.
Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4) 25: ‘The controller should find
simple ways to tell the data subject about the rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching the decision. The GDPR requires the controller
to provide meaningful information about the logic involved, not necessarily a complex explanation of the algorithms used or disclosure of the
full algorithm. The information provided should, however, be sufficiently
comprehensive for the data subject to understand the reasons for the decision’. See also at page 27: ‘the controller should provide the data subject
with general information (notably, on factors taken into account for the
decision-making process, and on their respective ‘weight’ on an aggregate
level) which is also useful for him or her to challenge the decision’ and
‘Recital 71 highlights that in any case suitable safeguards should also include: specific information to the data subject and the right (. . .) to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to
challenge the decision’.
Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford, ‘Seeing without Knowing: Limitations
of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic
Accountability’ (2018) 20(3) New Media & Society 973; M Hildebrandt,

establish the legitimacy, or illegitimacy, of a decisionmaking system by subjecting its logics and performance
to inspection and assessment as to whether they are socially acceptable or even illegal (what we and others call
a ‘justification’ of algorithmic decisions).24
Rejecting individual rights, as we discuss below, also
ignores the symbiosis between the GDPR’s two regimes.
Individual rights can play a crucial role in the GDPR’s
systemic collaborative governance. Understanding the
GDPR’s dual approach to algorithmic accountability
has the potential to answer important questions in the
literature about the value, in practice, of individual
rights in algorithmic accountability.25

Collaborative governance in the GDPR
The other side of algorithmic governance in the GDPR
is its systemic governance regime. This regime aims, primarily, to address instrumental goals: to prevent error,
bias, and discrimination.26 It focuses on assessing and
mitigating system-wide risks, including before an algorithm is deployed. It is largely constituted through collaborative governance, or a cooperative public–private
approach to regulation. We here illustrate two examples
of how this works in the GDPR.
Article 22’s suitable safeguards on ADM is one example of this in practice. The GDPR’s text does not comprehensively dictate what companies using ADM must
do to protect individual rights (Article 22). Instead, it
lists examples of safeguards (contestation, expression,
human intervention), but leaves it to both companies

20

21
22

23
24
25
26

‘The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era’ in J Bus
(ed), Digital Enlightenment Yearbook (2012th edn, Amsterdam: IOS Press
2012) 41–56; Edwards and Veale (n 3) 67; Bryce Goodman, ‘A Step
Towards Accountable Algorithms?: Algorithmic Discrimination and the
European Union General Data Protection’ (2016), 29th Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2016), Barcelona. NIPS
Foundation, 3–4; Joshua Kroll and others, ‘Accountable Algorithms’
(2017) 165(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633; Deven R
Desai and Joshua A. Kroll, ‘Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and
the Law’ (2017) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 27; Edwards and
Veale (n 3) 65–67.
See generally Kaminski (n 5). See also Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz,
‘Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive
Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55(1) Boston College Law Review 93; Danielle
Citron, ‘Technological Due Process’ (Faculty Scholarship, 30 April 2009)
1310; Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions’ (Faculty Scholarship, 1 January 2014)
20, 26.
Kroll and others (n 19) 660–63; Desai and Kroll (n 19); Edwards and
Veale (n 3) 76.
Lee A Bygrave, ‘Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data
Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’ (2001) 17(1) Computer
Law & Security Review 18.
Kaminski (n 5) 4; Hildebrandt (n 19) 47.
Kaminski, Ibid 15.
Ibid, passim.
Ibid 27.
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implementing Article 22(2)b of the GDPR have outlined
the Article 22 explanation duties in greater detail.16
Existing discussions of the Article 22 right to explanation, however, largely obscure the more complex approach to algorithmic transparency taken by the GDPR
as a whole. As we discuss below in section ‘Towards a
model AIA’, our view is that the GDPR’s transparency
rights are best discussed together as a system. That is,
the GDPR, is best understood as establishing a system
of multi-layered explanations.17 Individuals have a right
to both a system-wide but detailed description of the
logic of an algorithm (Articles 13, 14, 15), and more
specific insights on individual decisions taken.18 We discuss layers of explanations further in this section.
There have been legitimate concerns voiced in the legal literature both in Europe and in the USA about the
capacity of individuals to both invoke their rights and
execute oversight over algorithmic decision-making.19
These range from concerns about access to justice to
concerns about individual capacity and expertise.
Consequently, most policy proposals call either for a
dual regime, like the GDPR, that mixes individual rights
with systemic forms of accountability;20 or for foregoing
individual accountability in favour of expert and external oversight.21
The latter approach—foregoing individual rights entirely—ignores the dignitary and legitimizing value of
such rights.22 Individual rights allow individuals to exhibit autonomy and exert control, and to protest or reject their objectification by profiling or decision-making
machines.23 Individualized explanations also serve to
16
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27
28
29
30
31

Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4) 31–34.
Ibid 32.
Ibid 32. On Certifications and algorithms see also Edwards and Veale (n
3) 50.
Article 29 Working Party Guidelines, ibid 28.
Roig (n 3) 2 (‘the requirement of data protection impact assessment
(DPIA). . . could compile all the relevant safeguards for specific technologies and automatic processing and turn into a data generator for policy
purposes’).
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The DPIA as an algorithmic impact
assessment
Within this dual system of algorithmic accountability—
individual rights accompanied by extensive but collaborative governance of companies’ behaviour—the DPIA
plays a special role. We claim that as applied to algorithmic decision-making, the DPIA is best understood as a
nexus between the GDPR’s two approaches to algorithmic accountability. Understanding it in this way allows
us to better understand what is or might be required,
and to observe the tool’s potential shortcomings as
implemented in the GDPR.
The Guidelines on ADM interpret the GDPR to mandate DPIAs for all ADM with significant effects.32
Article 35(3)(a) requires a DPIA for ‘a systematic and
extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing. . .
on which decisions are based that produce legal effects
concerning the natural person or similarly significantly
affect the natural person’ (emphasis added). As Casey,
Farhangi, and Vogl have noted, ‘demonstrating that a
DPIA is not necessary will, in many instances, itself require a DPIA’.33 We note, too, that at least one Member
State, Slovenia, requires algorithmic impact assessments
(AIAs) for ADM under Article 22(1) of the GDPR.34
In this section, we address the DPIA as an AIA. We
identify what the purpose of the DPIA is in the GDPR,
and what it must include. Understanding the DPIA’s
purpose in algorithmic governance both clarifies what
the content should be and points to several shortcomings in the current conception of it. The GDPR’s DPIA
will serve, in the ADM context, as an AIA. It thus may
prove to be an example for governments around the
world considering using impact assessments as a tool to
achieve algorithmic accountability.

What is required in a DPIA?
In this section, we discuss the GDPR’s requirements for
a generic DPIA, before turning in the next sections to
requirements specific to algorithmic decision-making.
The GDPR requires DPIAs only under certain circumstances. The GDPR describes a DPIA as ‘an assessment
of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on
32

33
34

Creating a categorical requirement that applies ‘in the case of decisionmaking including profiling with legal or similarly significant effects that
is not wholly automated, as well as solely automated decision-making defined in Article 22(1)’. Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4).
Casey, Farhangi and Vogl (n 3) 176.
Predlog Zakona o varstvu osebnih podatkov – predlog za obravnavo –
nujni postopek – Novo Gradivo ST. 2 <http://www.mp.gov.si/fileadmin/
mp.gov.si/pageuploads/mp.gov.si/novice/2018/ZVOP-2_NG_2_apr.pdf>
accessed 8 October 2020.
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and regulators to determine what additional safeguards
are necessary. The accompanying Recital famously adds
a right to individual explanation (Recital 71). A more
detailed list of best practices can be found in several
sources, including the interpretative guidelines of the
Article 29 Working Party.27 These include, but are not
limited to regular quality assurance checks, algorithmic
auditing, independent auditing, establishing data minimization and clear retention periods, using pseudonymization techniques, certification mechanisms, ethical
review boards, and more.28
All these tools are attempts at establishing systemic
accountability and oversight, in a comprehensive and
ongoing manner. But the Guidelines make clear that
what counts as adequate safeguards will be established
through an ongoing conversation between companies
and regulators, involving government guidelines and
potentially involving industry-wide efforts to come up
with codes of conduct or other forms of standards
(Article 40).29 The GDPR thus harnesses companies’
efforts to help come up with both the substance and the
method of regulation in this space.
The GDPR’s approach to preventing bias and discrimination in algorithmic decision-making is another
example of collaborative governance in action. Recital
71 tasks companies with preventing ‘discriminatory
effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic
origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union
membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation’ in profiling and algorithmic decision-making. The
GDPR does not lay out how to do this. Instead, the
Guidelines suggest that companies check data sets for
bias, regularly review the accuracy and relevance of decisions, deploy systems that audit algorithms, and use ‘appropriate procedures and measures to prevent errors,
inaccuracies or discrimination’ on the basis of sensitive
data such as race, religion, or health information,
deployed on a cyclical basis.30
Again, the GDPR does not tell companies precisely
what to do. It identifies the problem, provides suggestions of what regulators might consider adequate, and
often tasks companies with cooperatively coming up
with solutions. Such company-created solutions may
then inform what regulators ultimately require.31
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36

37

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection
Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is ‘likely
to result in a high risk’ for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 14.
Ibid 15. See also Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4) 30: ‘An additional accountability requirement is the designation of a DPO, where the
profiling and/or the automated decision-making is a core activity of the
controller and requires regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale (Article 37(1)(b).’
In the original proposal of the Commission, consultation with data subjects was mandatory (art 33[4]). The Parliament’s text argued that this
‘represents a disproportionate burden on data controllers’ (amendment
262). Accordingly, the approved art 35(9) requires consultation only
‘where appropriate’ and ‘without prejudice to the protection of commercial or public interests or the security of the processing operations’.

In lieu of public or formal stakeholder consultation,
the GDPR requires consultation ‘where appropriate’
with impacted individuals (Article 35(9)).37 This puts in
place one method for external input from impacted
individuals rather than external experts or the public.
The DPIA Guidelines suggest that this input could be,
for example, in the form of surveys crafted by companies and sent to future customers. This would make
external input less meaningful than, say, deep consultation with a board of representatives of civil society
members or chosen community representatives, as envisioned in the literature on impact assessments reviewed
in section ‘Proposals for AIAs’.38 The DPIA Guidelines
explain that if companies do not seek these external
views, they have an obligation to justify this decision.39
In addition, if companies do seek these views and then
disregard them, they must document why they have
chosen to disregard external input.40
As for other forms of external oversight, the
Guidelines recommend but do not require seeking advice from independent experts, ranging from lawyers
and sociologists to data security experts.41 The GDPR
does not generally require most DPIAs to be overseen
by a public authority (the Data Protection Authority).
But if a risk assessment indicates that processing would
result in high risk in the absence of measures taken by
the controller to mitigate the risk, then a company must
consult with the regulator before processing (Article
36). Thus a company effectively decides itself whether it
should be subject to regulatory oversight, as part of the
impact assessment process.
In the biggest departure from the impact assessment
proposals discussed below, DPIAs are not legally required to be released to the public, even when finalized.42 As the Guidelines explain, ‘[p]ublishing a DPIA
is not a legal requirement of the GDPR . . . [h]owever,
data controllers should consider publishing their DPIA,
or perhaps part of their DPIA.’43 The Guidelines caution that it is a good practice to publish DPIAs, especially where members of the public are impacted. But
companies need not publish the entire assessment; the

38

39
40
41
42
43

Reuben Binns, ‘Data Protection Impact Assessments: A Meta-Regulatory
Approach’ (2017) 7(1) International Data Privacy Law 28.
Article 29 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (n 35) 15.
See also Dariusz Kloza and others, ‘Data Protection Impact Assessments
in the European Union: Complementing the New Legal Framework towards a More Robust Protection of Individuals’ D.Pia.Lab Policy Brief
No 1/2017, n.d., 4 <https://cris.vub.be/files/32009890/dpialab_pb2017_
1_final.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020.
Article 29 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (n 35) 15.
Ibid 15.
Ibid 15.
Ibid 18.
Ibid 17.
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the protection of personal data’ (Article 35). That assessment, per the text of the GDPR, must include: a description of the ‘processing operations’ (in this case, the
algorithm) and the purpose of the processing; an assessment of the necessity of processing in relation to the
purpose; an assessment of the risks to individual rights
and freedoms; and importantly, the measures a company will use to address these risks and demonstrate
GDPR compliance, including security measures (Article
35(7)) (Recitals 84, 90).
The DPIA must occur before a company implements
a system. That is, a company must assess a system and
propose risk-mitigation measures, before data processing takes place (Article 35(1)). But the GDPR also envisions iteration. For example, if the risk posed by a
system changes, a company must assess whether it is
complying with its own Impact Assessment (Article
35(11)). It should also under such circumstances review
and possibly revise the DPIA itself.
The DPIA Guidelines suggest an even more dynamic
view of DPIAs. They suggest that DPIAs should as a
matter of good practice actually be continuous,
‘updated throughout the lifecycle [of the] project’, and
that they should be re-assessed or revised at least every
three years. ‘Carrying out a DPIA is a continual process,
not a one-time exercise’, per the DPIA Guidelines.35
This continual process involves assessing risk, deploying
risk-mitigation measures, documenting their efficacy
through monitoring, and feeding that information back
into the risk assessment. The DPIA Guidelines interpret
this process by running ‘multiple times’.
The GDPR also lays out procedural requirements for
the DPIA. Differing from most of the impact assessments imagined in the literature and discussed in section ‘Proposals for AIAs’, DPIAs do not involve a
period of public comment or input. Many companies
that are required to perform AIAs will likely have an internal but independent DPO in place (Article 38).36 The
GDPR requires consultation with this DPO, if a data
controller has one.
35
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What is the purpose of a DPIA, in the context
of the GDPR’s algorithmic governance?
Having discussed the requirements for a generic DPIA,
we now turn to the specific application of the DPIA as
an ‘algorithmic impact assessment’, aided both by our
understanding of the GDPR’s approach to algorithmic
governance, and by the Guidelines on ADM. Thus far
few commentators have linked the GDPR provisions on
ADM to the DPIA process.47 The DPIA as an AIA plays
a particularly central role in the GDPR’s approach to
governing algorithmic decision-making. We posit that
in the context of the GDPR’s algorithmic governance regime, the DPIA should be understood as a nexus between the GPDR’s two approaches to governing
algorithmic decision-making. The DPIA links the
GDPR’s individual rights to its systemic governance of
algorithms.
Understanding the DPIA in this way both clarifies its
potential content and leads us to observations about
how the DPIA as an AIA might be implemented and
44
45

46

Ibid.
Alessandro Mantelero, ‘AI and Big Data: A Blueprint for a Human
Rights, Social and Ethical Impact Assessment’ (2018) 34(4) Computer
Law & Security Review 766; Frank Vanclay and others, ‘Social Impact
Assessment: Guidance for Assessing and Managing the Social Impacts of
Projects’ (International Association for Impact Assessment, April 2015)
<https://www.iaia.org/uploads/pdf/SIA_Guidance_Document_IAIA.
pdf> accessed 8 October 2020; Simon Walker, The Future of Human
Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements, School of Human Rights
Research Series, v. 35 (Antwerp; Portland: Intersentia 2009) 39–42.
Dillon Reisman and others, ‘Algorithm Impact Assessment: A Practical
Frameworks for Public Agency Accountability’ (AI Now Institute, n.d.) 7
<https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020.
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even improved. The DPIA is not a perfect AIA. As a tool
in the GDPR’s overall algorithmic governance regime,
however, it has more potential than might initially meet
the eye.

How understanding the DPIA’s dual role helps
clarify its content
The DPIA has two roles: as a tool in the GDPR’s systemic (and collaborative) governance regime, and as an
element of the GDPR’s protection of individual rights.
Understanding the DPIA in this way—as a connection
between the two regulatory subsystems—lets us better
understand how it is meant to function as an AIA, to
the extent of further clarifying its content. It also leads
us to some insights in the next section (‘Towards a
model AIA’) about the layers of algorithmic explanations produced by, and to be released according to, the
GDPR.
When understood as part of the GDPR’s collaborative governance of algorithms,48 the DPIA can be characterized as a form of monitored self-regulation. That
is, the DPIA tasks companies with identifying problems
and coming up with solutions, with internal oversight
and some external input, under a threat of regulatory
oversight but ordinarily minimal regulatory supervision.
Binns has similarly identified the DPIA as ‘metaregulation’.49
Monitored self-regulation attempts to change both a
company’s decision-making processes and its decisionmaking heuristics.50 Collaborative governance generally
is centrally concerned with affecting management culture and creating meaningful changes within a company.51 The DPIA, applied in the context of algorithmic
decision-making, tasks companies with considering
risks of unfairness, error, bias, and discrimination, and
with coming up with concrete ways of mitigating those
risks. This aims to affect firms’ decisional heuristics by
dictating, through the GDPR’s text, the Recitals, and the
Guidelines, what values a company must consider in
building and overseeing algorithmic decision-making.
47

48
49

50
51

But see Casey, Farhangi and Vogl (n 3) 170–84, largely focused on practical compliance, discussing the Guidelines on Automated DecisionMaking and DPIA.
Kaminski (n 5) 57.
Binns (n 37) 23, 29 has similarly described DPIAs as ‘meta-regulation,’
which he characterizes as a narrower subset of co-regulation, ‘a means
for the state to make corporations responsible for their own efforts to
self-regulate’.
Bamberger (n 8) 435.
Alexander A Boni-Saenz, ‘Public-Private Partnerships and Insurance
Regulation’ (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1375; Freeman (n 8);
Bamberger (n 8).
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published DPIA ‘could even consist of just a summary
of the DPIA’s main findings’.44 As some scholars have
remarked, there are cases in which full disclosure of the
assessment results may be limited by the legitimate
interests of the data controller, such as interests in the
confidentiality of information, in security, and in
competition.45
The GDPR and the DPIA Guidelines thus give an
overview of, but little specific guidance on, what exactly
a company must put in a DPIA report in the context of
AIAs. Unlike the impact assessments proposed in the legal literature, the GDPR does not require public input
or public disclosure, though the DPIA Guidelines suggest both as best practices. This has led one policy proposal to dismiss the GDPR’s DPIAs as ‘not shared with
the public, and hav[ing] no built-in external researcher
review or other individualized due process mechanisms’.46 As we discuss below, this is not entirely correct, if one re-evaluates the role of the DPIA in the
specific context of ADM.
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See also Binns (n 37) 23.
Bamberger (n 8) 467. See also Sonia K. Katyal, ‘Private Accountability in
the Age of Artificial Intelligence’ (2019) 66 UCLA Law Review 140.
Article 29 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (n 35) 20.
See also the investigatory powers of Data Protection Authority at art
58(1) GDPR. See also Selbst and Barocas’s call for documentation

Guidelines on ADM a version of individual due process.
The GDPR requires companies using solely ADM, under the exceptions to its ban on such practices, to implement suitable measures to protect individual rights
(Article 22). Data controllers should use DPIAs to ‘identify what measures they will introduce to address the. . .
risks involved’.56 The Guidelines on ADM suggest that
measures include not just the use of audits or other
forms of systemic accountability, but also a number of
recognizable individual rights: informing individuals
about the logic involved, explaining the significance and
envisaged consequences of algorithmic decisionmaking, providing a way to contest a decision, and providing a way to express one’s point of view.57 The
Guidelines on ADM counsel companies to import these
various individual rights laid out in the GDPR’s Article
22 as a form of risk management throughout the DPIA
process. They suggest implementing these individual
rights as part of a risk-management strategy even for algorithmic decision-making that is not ‘solely automated’, but that more significantly involves a human
decision-maker.
In other words, we might interpret the GDPR
provisions on the DPIA as serving as a form of
commitment-making to protecting, or even enabling,
individual algorithmic due process rights. By characterizing these individual rights as risk-mitigation measures,
the Guidelines on ADM both provide a substantive
backstop as to what must be included in a DPIA, and
task companies with constituting—through the process
of performing a DPIA—what these individual rights
will look like in practice. Thus the DPIA serves as a
means of expanding company commitments, changing
company decision-making heuristics to include an assessment of individual due process rights. It simultaneously serves as a collaborative governance mechanism
used to involve companies in constituting the substance,
in practice, of individual due process rights. 58
Finally, the DPIA has a role in linking the GPDR’s
system of collaborative governance to its individual
rights regime through the imposition of systemic accountability measures such as audits or external reviews.
Remember, the general DPIA Guidelines only suggest,
and do not mandate, consultation with external experts.
In the context of algorithmic decision-making, however,
external expert involvement and oversight is more

55
56
57
58

requirements in ‘The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines’ (2018)
87 Fordham Law Review 1085.
Reisman and others (n 46) 10.
Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4) 30.
Ibid 30.
Kaminski (n 5) 18.
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The process of conducting the DPIA—taking input
from impacted individuals, consulting with an independent DPO, consulting with a regulator where required,
and involving both internal and external experts and
stakeholders—is meant to change internal company
processes.52 Baking in a compliance culture can be valuable, even where public oversight and input is not
sought.53 The DPIA can also be understood in this context as a necessary precursor to government regulation,
serving as a documentation requirement, and creating
records that can later be sought and inspected by regulators under the GDPR’s extensive information-forcing
capabilities.54
The DPIA also, however, has an unexplored role in
the GDPR’s system of individual rights.
First, the DPIA can serve as a source of material for
the much-discussed disclosures to individuals about algorithmic decision-making: the individual notification
and access rights. Remember, data subjects have a right
to receive ‘meaningful information’ about the ‘logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences’ of ADM (Articles 13, 14, 15). A DPIA must
contain, as mentioned above, ‘a systematic description
of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes
of the processing. . .’ (Article 35(7)). If companies must
already internally describe ADM at a systematic level as
part of the DPIA process, those internal descriptions
could be disclosed to individuals, or at least serve as the
basis for these disclosures, in addition to being released
to the public in the form of summaries.
Similarly, a DPIA must include an assessment of ‘the
risks to the rights and freedoms’ of individuals, and
individuals have a right in the context of ADM to be informed of the ‘significance and envisaged consequences’
of such decision-making (Articles 35, 13, 14, 15). Again,
as a company conducting ADM must conduct a DPIA,
it should consider how the information it produces in
that process might also feed into or even satisfy the individual rights requirements under the GDPR.
Secondly, the DPIA as envisioned by the Guidelines
on ADM can push companies to establish protections
for individual rights as part of the risk-mitigation process. Despite other commentators’ dismissal of DPIAs
as failing to put in place individual due process,55 the
DPIA is an essential aspect of establishing suitable measures to safeguard individual rights, including per the
52
53
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and it reassures individuals that their dignity and other
rights are being respected by a fair system.62 It also provides legitimation or justification. As the mechanism
through which this external oversight is implemented,
the DPIA thus connects the two approaches to algorithmic governance in the GDPR.

59
60
61

63

62

See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4) 32.
Malgieri and Comandé (n 2) 248.
Article 29 Working Party Guidelines (n 4) 28, 32. See Casey, Farhangi
and Vogl (n 3) 170–80, emphasizing the centrality of algorithmic audits.
See Kaminski (n 5) 28; Binns (n 37) 32 discusses a similar notion in the
regulatory theory literature, Gilad’s concept of regulatory tiers. Gilad, ‘It
Runs in the Family: Meta-regulation and Its Siblings’ (2010) 4(4)
Regulation & Governance485, 497.

Shortcomings of the DPIA
The biggest shortcoming of the DPIA is that it does not
include a mechanism for mandatory disclosure to the
public.63 Public disclosure, as discussed in section
‘Elements of a model AIA’, is understood by many to be
an essential element of impact assessments as a policy
tool.64 Public-facing disclosure enables public feedback,
both in the form of market feedback (enabling individuals to avoid companies with bad policies) and in the
form of regulatory feedback over the longer term (enabling individuals to elect representatives who will put
in place laws that will prevent bad company behaviour).
By failing to mandate public disclosure, the GPDR’s
DPIA fails to trigger both of these mechanisms, which
are essential components of a functioning collaborative
governance regime.
This failure could be drastic. The GDPR puts a lot of
faith in the behaviour of companies and in the capacity
of regulators. As discussed, the GDPR often tasks companies with coming up with the substance of (i) how individual rights will be implemented and (ii) how to
address unfairness, biases, and discrimination-related
concerns about algorithms. In the absence of public
oversight, how can we be sure that this hybrid system of
individual rights and collaborative governance is working towards the public good?
One possible answer is to use heavy regulatory oversight. But the GDPR’s enforcers have not, historically,
been well-resourced in relation to the companies they
regulate. Tasking regulators with extensive monitoring
also forgoes some of the touted benefits of governing
through public–private partnerships, including lowered
costs and incorporating external third-party expertise.
By failing to require the public disclosure of impact
assessments, the GDPR fails to activate necessary third
parties in its governance regime, such as civil society
actors or civic-minded experts who might not be
recruited for auditing purposes. The DPIA also

64

Kloza and others (n 38) 3; Michael Veale, Reuben Binns and Jef Ausloos,
‘When Data Protection by Design and Data Subject Rights Clash’ (2018)
8(2) International Data Privacy Law 118.
Reisman and others (n 46) 13. See also Andrew D Selbst, ‘Disparate
Impact in Big Data Policing’ (2017) 52 Georgia Law Review 119. See also
A. Michael Froomkin, ‘Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy
Pollution: Learning from Environmental Impact Statements’ (2015) 2015
University of Illinois Law Review 1790.
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necessary and can be understood as an essential riskmitigation measure for algorithmic decision-making.59
The reasoning goes as follows. Recital 71 requires, in
the context of algorithmic decision-making, the use of
‘technical and organisational measures appropriate to
ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are corrected and the risk of
errors is minimised. . .and that prevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects’ (Recital 71). Malgieri and Comandé
observe that this requirement effectively expands the
GDPR’s ‘suitable safeguards’ requirement from the series of individual due-process-like protections enumerated in the GDPR’s text, to a far broader set of systemic
accountability measures, including third-party auditing
(Article 22).60
The Guidelines on ADM’s list of best practices for
suitable safeguards over algorithmic decision-making
includes recommendations that companies use both internal and external audits and external review boards,
supporting this interpretation.61 This means that in the
context of algorithmic decision-making, a company
running through the cyclical DPIA process discussed
above will likely incorporate external oversight and input at the risk mitigation stage, bringing external input
into the cycle despite the fact that it is not a formal procedural requirement for DPIAs in general.
Conceptually, the implications of this are even
broader. By characterizing third-party and expert oversight as a form of ‘suitable safeguard’ or ‘suitable measure’ to protect individual rights in the face of ADM, the
recommendation in the Guidelines on ADM links individual rights protection with collaborative governance
techniques. Companies are tasked with coming up with
ways to prevent error, bias, discrimination, and other
harms to individual rights, and external oversight is imposed over how they choose to address these problems.
That external oversight itself is also conceptualized as a
crucial aspect of individual rights in the GDPR, standing in for individuals to ensure that they are not subjected to an unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory, or
erroneous system.
A simpler way to say this is that expert oversight in
the DPIA process serves two, or even three, roles: it
watches the companies as they come up with ways of
addressing problems with algorithmic decision-making,

134

A model AIA: towards multi-layered
explanations
From examining the GDPR’s DPIA mechanism generally to discussing the DPIA as an AIA, we now turn to
imagining a more ideal DPIA.
We close this article with a call for more work on
establishing a model AIA that could serve as a basis for
what we call multi-layered explanations of algorithmic
decision-making. This will involve interdisciplinary
efforts: technologists to assess what risk-mitigation and
accountability measures could be implemented, and
lawyers and ethicists to think through how to better involve constituents and define problems. It will also involve a deeper exploration of how to link the material

See Binns (n 37) 33; Casey, Farhangi and Vogl (n 3) 180.
See eg Kenneth A Bamberger and Deirdre K. Mulligan, ‘PIA
Requirements and Privacy Decision-Making in US Government
Agencies’ in D Wright and P De Hert (eds), Privacy Impact Assessment,
Law, Governance and Technology Series (Dordrecht: Springer 2012) 225;
Reuben Binns, ‘Data Protection Impact Assessments: A Meta-regulatory
Approach’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 22; Casey, Farhangi
and Vogl (n 3); Roger Clarke, ‘Privacy Impact Assessment: Its Origins
and Development’ (2009) 25 Computer Law & Security Review 123;
Froomkin (n 64) 1713; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, ‘Assessing the Federal Trade
Commission’s Privacy Assessments’ (2016) 14(2) IEEE Security &
Privacy 58; Katyal (n 53) 54, 112; Mantelero (n 45) 754; David Wright
and Charles D. Raab, ‘Constructing a Surveillance Impact Assessment’

created during the DPIA process to the individual disclosures required under the GDPR.
We are not the first to focus on AIAs, or impact
assessments, in closely related fields.66 We are, however,
the first to discuss AIAs not in isolation, but as a central
component, among many components, of the GDPR’s
two-prong approach to algorithmic accountability. This
changes the nature of the conversation. Instead of examining impact assessments in isolation from other accountability tools, it situates them within an
overarching governance system.
Our GDPR-specific analysis, then, may have
implications for proposals for AIAs in other legal systems.67 It suggests that impact assessments best serve a
role in conversation with other accountability tools, as
part of overarching regulatory design.68 And it suggests
that impact assessments play a central role both as a
source of and mediator between the multi-layered individual explanations we believe are indicated in the
GDPR.

Proposals for AIAs
We begin with an overview of the discussion that has
arisen recently over AIAs. AIAs have received a good
deal of attention on both sides of the Atlantic as possible
tools to address problems of algorithmic discrimination,
bias, and unfairness—including in at least one proposed
US federal law.69 We here briefly discuss several important precursors to the AIA: Environmental Impact
Statements (EISs), Human Rights Impact Assessments
(HRIAs), Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), Ethical
Impact Assessments (EIAs), and Surveillance Impact
Assessments (SIAs). It is important to clarify that, apart
from the EIS, many of the below impact assessment
models are voluntary. That is, they are not required by
law in any legal system. In this section, we discuss how
these different elaborations, most taking inspiration
from the EIA under US law, have led to more recent
proposals for AIAs.

67
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(2012) 28 Computer Law & Security Review 613; Marc L Roark, ‘Human
Impact Statements’ (2015) 54 Washburn Law Journal 649; Reisman and
others (n 46); Selbst (n 64) 169; David Wright and Michael Friedewald,
‘Integrating Privacy and Ethical Impact Assessments’ (2013) 40 Science
and Public Policy 755.
See eg more generally Reisman and others (n 46).
Katyal (n 53) 117 suggests this by emphasizing the concurrent need for
whistleblower protection. But not an overarching governance system.
Wyden, Clarke, and Booker’s Algorithmic Accountability Act. See
<https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-bookerclarke-introduce-bill-requiring-companies-to-target-bias-in-corporatealgorithms-> accessed 8 October 2020.
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potentially fails to involve real stakeholder input, if
companies follow the Guidelines and consult with
stakeholders using only simplistic surveys.65
Individual notification and access rights could do
some of the necessary accountability work for the
GDPR’s attempts at collaborative governance. This is
somewhat more convincing. If companies indeed link
their DPIA content to what they disclose to individuals
(for example, disclosing the systemic description of
processing uncovered during a DPIA to individuals
as the ‘logic involved’ in a decision-making system),
then it is likely that these disclosures will make their
way to other third parties, who may be able to provide
the expertise and oversight over company selfgovernance. For example, an individual who feels she
has been discriminated against might disclose the information she has received about a system’s decisions to a
civil society group, which could in turn help publicize
the story and the information, triggering market mechanisms or regulatory feedback from the public or oversight by external experts. This is, however, a more
attenuated way of getting at the same outcome as public
disclosure, and risks failing entirely if companies significantly disaggregate the DPIA process from individual
disclosure rights.

65
66
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forcing’ regulation that ‘push[es] decision-makers to do
their homework and engage with the public’.80 Selbst
describes the EIS model not as an alternative to substantive regulation, but as a necessary precursor to it.81
Froomkin, too, notes that public transparency can ‘ignite a regulatory dynamic by collecting information
about the privacy costs of previously unregulated activities that should, in the end, lead to significant
results’.82Thus, these two scholars envision impact statements as having positive consequences both for the particular project at issue and for forward movement in a
larger policy debate.
For some, however, the EIS model fails to go far
enough. The EIS process is static in nature, taking place
only prior to the commencement of a project.83 It is
procedural, rather than substantive; it does not set substantive requirements, nor prohibits anybody from doing anything.84 And while the EIS process requires
public transparency and input, it does not require ongoing monitoring for compliance.85
Other proposals for impact assessments thus draw on
additional sources as models, some of which in turn
also trace their origins to the EIS.86 Mantelero, for example, draws partially on the model of HRIAs.87 Katyal,
too, references the HRIA process.88 The voluntary
HRIA process outlined by the United Nations89 is a
comparatively time- and resource-intensive process
conducted on a business by third-party assessors, who
collect data and interview stakeholders, experts, and
management.90 Wright and Friedewald look to EIAs as
a model for PIAs. EIAs, similar to HRIAs, are voluntary
assessments that go beyond legal compliance to assess
the ethical implications of new technologies, and
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(2012) 42 USC s 4332(C). See Reisman and others (n 46) 7 (‘The EIS
process combines a focus on core values with a means for the public, outside experts, and policymakers to consider complex social and technical
questions’); Selbst (n 64) 168 (‘before adopting predictive policing technology, police should be required to create “algorithmic impact statements” (AISs), modeled on the environmental impact statements (EISs)
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)’) See also Froomkin
(n 64) 1749; See Roark (n 66) 18.
42 USC s 4332(2)(C) (1969); 40 CFR s 1508.18 (defining ‘Major Federal
Action’). This includes ‘projects and programs entirely or partly financed,
assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies’. Thus
NEPA can apply to the behaviour of private actors, where they are
funded or permitted by a federal agency. In fact, private actors applying
for federal permits often participate in the EIS/EA process. See Froomkin
(n 64) 1751, fn 205.
See Froomkin (n 64) 1750.
40 CFR s 1508.9(1), (3)(b) (1969).
42 USC s 4332(C) (2012); 40 CFR s 1502.14.
See Selbst (n 64) 178 (describing the two notice-and-comment periods,
one to define the scope of the EIS and the second on the draft).
Froomkin (n 64) 1751.
Ibid 1755.
Ibid 1756
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Selbst (n 64) 169.
ibid 168 (‘It is hard to say in the abstract what stronger regulatory solutions may be required, or how big a problem the technology poses in reality, until more information about the technology’s implementation is
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Froomkin (n 64) 1747.
Selbst (n 64) 172.
See Katyal (n 53) 115.
Selbst (n 64) 188; Clarke (n 66) 125 (describing an EIS as ‘insufficiently
auditable’).
See Clarke, ibid 125. See also Mantelero (n 45) 757, which describes
HRIA’s as having their roots in the EIS.
Mantelero, ibid 762. His HRSEIA is a (voluntary) hybrid. Lighter touch
than HRIA, but takes into account ethical, social, human rights
(grounded in human rights law).
Katyal (n 53) 112.
United Nations, Human Rights Council, Office Of The High Comm’r,
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) 23–26 <https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_
EN.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020.
Mantelero (n 45) 764.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article/11/2/125/6024963 by Univ of Colorado Libraries user on 31 December 2021

The inspiration for many US-based impact assessment proposals is the EIS, established in the USA in
1969 by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).70 NEPA’s impact statement requirement
applies when a federal agency proposes to take a ‘major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment’.71 As a threshold matter, agencies
assess coverage and query whether any ‘Categorical
Exclusions’ apply.72 If no exclusion applies, the agency
as a first step performs an Environmental Assessment
(EA), a public document that must ‘provide sufficient
evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement’.73 Then the
agency either issues a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI), or goes on to prepare an EIS. Before a project
can go forward, the full EIS must be prepared and must
contain a detailed statement on the environmental impact of a project, including any adverse effects which
cannot be avoided, and alternatives.74 The EIS is subject
to comment by the public and other government agencies,75 and individuals can sue if an EIS is incomplete or
inadequate, thereby delaying the project.76
A number of US commentators have used the EIS as
a model for impact assessments in other contexts.
Froomkin, for example, touts the EIS as an effective alternative to command-and-control regulation, and a
model for his proposed Privacy Impact Notice.77
According to Froomkin, the EIS is a good regulatory
model for data privacy notices because it (i) pushes
agencies to ‘consider . . . issues in the early design phase
of their projects’78 and (ii) informs the public and solicits public feedback.79 Selbst, who similarly bases his call
for Algorithmic Impact Statements (AISs) on the EIS
model, agrees that an impact assessment is an ‘action-
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Determine whether a PIA (or SIA) is necessary (threshold analysis).
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PIA but consisting of a similar ‘process of engaging
stakeholders in order to identify the impacts on privacy
and other values of a new project, technology, service or
other initiative in order to take remedial action to minimise, avoid or overcome the risks’.100
But these proposals articulate the ideal. Mantelero
observes that in practice, DPIAs even in the European
context have tended to focus on data quality and data
security, leaving out broader social and legal impact despite aspirational language to the contrary.101
We now turn to recent proposals for AIAs, which
draw to varying degrees on these precursors. We find
both common threads and significant differences in the
proposals. We also find a significant gap in this literature that our perspective on the GDPR helps to fill.
Selbst proposes the use of an AIS, modelled after the
EIS with some modifications. His proposal would apply
narrowly to police departments looking to acquire and
use predictive policing technologies. An AIS would, in
Selbst’s proposal, be performed prior to using such
technology. First, this Statement would, like an EIS, require policy departments to ‘rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives’, including
by having third-party vendors ‘(1) explain the various
design choices, (2) measure the resulting efficacy using
the best available audit methods, and (3) evaluate the
resulting disparate impact for the various systems and
configurations’.102 Secondly, a police department would
have to ‘devote substantial treatment to each alternative’.103 It would be required to ‘include the alternative
of no action’.104 It would be required to identify a preferred alternative among the various algorithm design
choices disclosed.105 And finally, police would have to
include proposed mitigation measures in the AIS.106 To

91

101
102
103
104
105
106

Determine the budget for the PIA (or SIA).
Describe the proposed project to be assessed.
Identify stakeholders.
Analyse the information flows and other impacts.
Consult with stakeholders.
Determine whether the project complies with legislation.
Identify risks and possible solutions.
Formulate recommendations.
Prepare and publish the report, eg on the organisation’s website.
Implement the recommendations.
Ensure a third-party review and/or audit of the PIA (or SIA).
Update the PIA (or SIA) if there are changes in the project.
Embed privacy awareness throughout the organisation and ensure
accountability.
Mantelero (n 45) 761.
Selbst (n 64) 173.
ibid.
ibid 176.
ibid.
ibid 177.
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involve consultation with a wide number of stakeholders and publication of the assessment.91
However, the most direct precursor for the GDPR’s
version of the AIA is the PIA.92 As Clarke explains, PIAs
originated in the 1990s around the world, with multiple
regulators issuing guidance in the early 2000s.93 While
PIAs as conducted in the USA have been widely decried
as toothless,94 elsewhere they are considerably more
substantial.95 Clarke identifies the EIS as a ‘progenitor’
of the PIA, but goes on to name a number of important
differences.96 In several European countries, for example, the PIA may have originated as part of the system
of ‘prior checking’ under earlier data protection
regimes, which was effectively a system of government
registration or licensing of data processing systems,
prior to processing.97 In order to receive a license from
a national authority, a company had to assess whether it
was in compliance with national data protection law.
This differs vastly from the EIS, which has no substantive underpinnings and does not serve as the basis for a
licensing regime.
Clarke outlines the characteristics of an ideal PIA. He
describes the assessment as being performed on a project rather than an organization; being anticipatory in
nature rather than retrospective; being broad in scope
with respect to individual, group, community, and
other ‘dimensions’ of privacy; taking into account the
perspectives of affected segments of the population; being broader than legal compliance; being oriented towards surfacing solutions, not just problems;
emphasizing process over product; and requiring engagement from executives and managers.98 In 2012,
Wright and Raab proposed the concept of a
Surveillance Impact Assessment,99 wider in scope than a
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Finally, we return to the context of the GDPR.
Mantelero discusses the idea of a Human Rights, Social
and Ethical Impact Assessment (HRSEIA) in the AI
context.118 A hybrid between a HRIA and a PIA, the
HRSEIA suggests that businesses voluntarily take into
account ethical and social impact, in addition to human
rights.119 Mantelero emphasizes the role of such an impact assessment in addressing the collective dimensions
of data harms, that is, the impact of surveillance or
processing on groups or locations.
At its core, Mantelero’s HRSEIA has three features: it
is participatory, it is transparent, and it is circular in nature.120 Practically, it consists of a self-assessment questionnaire, sometimes leading to evaluation by an ad hoc
committee of experts.121 Stakeholder engagement is encouraged but not required.122 Similarly, public disclosure is encouraged.123 Mantelero explains that while this
proposal is ‘[i]n line with the declared intent of the
GDPR’, he does not understand the GDPR to require a
HRSEIA.124 Several other commentators have recently
discussed the DPIA and the role it plays in the context
of algorithmic accountability more generally.125
Notably, many or even most of the above proposals
for impact assessments centrally emphasize the release
of information to the public.126 This is necessary both
to obtain external input into how a system is developed,
trained, or monitored, and to gain public legitimacy
and acceptance for the use of a system. The kind of information released to the public can be more in the nature of a summary or an overview; it is not necessarily
the source code.127 Some suggest a tiered release of information, with summaries released to the public and
detailed or sensitive information released only to regulators or experts.128 Thus, more recent proposals call for
expert input and oversight as a central component of
the impact assessment process—that companies (or
government agencies) use impact assessments to come
up with, and stick to, a plan for third-party expert oversight over a system’s development and eventual ongoing
use.129
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108
109
110
111
112
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117
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121
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123
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ibid 178.
Katyal (n 53) 115.
ibid.
ibid 116.
Resiman and others (n 46) cit.
ibid.
Ibid 8.
ibid 6.
ibid 10.
ibid 18
ibid 16.
Mantelero (n 45) passim.
ibid 762.
ibid 759.

ibid 758.
ibid 769.
ibid.
ibid 762.
Casey, Farhangi and Vogl (n 3) 170; Edwards and Veale (n 3) 77–80.
Selbst (n 64) 118; Reisman and others (n 46) 4.
Council of Europe, ‘Guidelines on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data in a World of Big Data’
(Strasbourg, 23 January 2017) 4; Selbst (n 64) 190; Kristian Lum and
William Isaac, ‘To Predict and Serve?’ (2016) 13(5) Significance 14–19.
128 Mantelero (n 45) 766.
129 Christian Sandvig and others, ‘Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for
Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms’ (2014), <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~csandvig/research/Auditing%20Algorithms%20–
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address various concerns about the EIS model, Selbst
emphasizes the importance of public disclosure and
comment, and judicial oversight with not just procedural but substantive bite.107
Katyal incorporates elements of Selbst’s proposal
into her suggestion of a Human Impact Statement in
Algorithmic Decision-making.108 She recommends as a
backstop a substantive, rather than purely procedural,
commitment to algorithmic accountability and anti-discrimination.109 She adds that companies should also (i)
identify potentially impacted populations and determine their status-based categories; (ii) identify the effect
of uncertainty or error on those groups; and (iii) study
whether the decision will have an adverse impact on a
particular subpopulation.110 Unlike Selbst, Katyal recommends the HIS as a voluntary measure undertaken
by private industry, rather than required by law.
The AI Now Institute, a research institute housed at
New York University,111 issued a report that appears to
build on Selbst’s proposal.112 The authors of the report
call for a pre-procurement AIA before any public
agency—not just the police—commits to the use of an
ADM system.113 Like Selbst’s proposal, the AI Now proposal is limited to covering the public sector. Like
Selbst’s proposal, it would be mandatory rather than
voluntary. Unlike Selbst’s proposal, it goes beyond the
policing context.114
At first glance, the AI Now proposal looks similar to
an EIS in a number of ways. Like an EIS, the AIA must
be done prior to implementing a project. Like an EIS,
the proposed model requires agency disclosure and a
public comment period. Unlike an EIS, however, the
proposed model is envisioned as being renewed every
two years.115 Unlike an EIS, which does not create a system for ongoing monitoring, a substantial portion of AI
Now’s proposal is dedicated to ongoing processes to be
established by the AIA, including both meaningful access for researchers and auditors once systems are
deployed,116 and individual due process for those affected by the system’s decisions.117
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Lessons for calls for AIAs generally

130

131
132
133

%20Sandvig%20–
%20ICA%202014%20Data%20and%20Discrimination%20Preconference.pdfaccessed 8 October 2020; Reisman and others (n 46) 18–20.
Edwards and Veale (n 3) 77–80 understand this, as they discuss the DPIA
in the context of many other rights in the GDPR. See also Kaminski (n 5)
69.
Katyal (n 53) 117.
Edwards and Veale (n 3) 77–80; Casey, Farhangi and Vogl (n 3) 170.
Only one proposal, to our knowledge, suggests using Impact Assessments
to establish something resembling individual rights—a system of ‘enhanced due process mechanisms for affected individuals’. Reisman and
others (n 46).

GDPR’s individual rights and principles about algorithmic decision-making are articulated in broad, sometimes aspirational, terms.135 Unlike an EIS, the GDPR’s
version of the AIA has a substantive backstop in, for example, Recital 71’s admonishment that a data controller
should minimize the risk of error and prevent discriminatory effects. The oddity is the GDPR’s circularity: the
AIA helps not just to implement but to constitute both
these substantive backstops and the GDPR’s individual
rights. Thus, there is a substantive backstop to company
self-regulation through impact assessments—but it is a
moving target, in part given meaning by affected companies themselves.
Finally, because the AIA links individual and systemic governance, we understand the GDPR’s version
of the AIA to be both the potential source of and the
mediator between what we refer to below as ‘multi-layered explanations’ contemplated in the GDPR. Several
of the above scholars, including both Mantelero and
Wright and Raab, emphasize the often collective dimensions of surveillance and data processing.136 The
GDPR’s system of individual rights threatens by itself to
miss the impact of surveillance, or in this case, ADM,
on groups, locations, and society at large.137 A recent AI
Now report provides an illustrative example of the
problem: providing an individualized explanation for a
single ‘stop and frisk’ incident in New York City would
have failed to reveal that over 80 per cent of those subjected to stop and frisk by the NYPD were Black or
Latino men.138 But the Impact Assessment with its systemic approach to risk assessment and risk mitigation
requires data controllers to analyse how the system
impacts not just individuals but groups. We believe that
systemic and group-based explanations uncovered during an AIA can and should be communicated to outside
stakeholders, and that a case can be made that such release is required under the GDPR.

134 Binns (n 66) 29 describing DPIAs as ‘enforced risk-assessment, and compliance with self-imposed, stakeholder-influenced policies. . . as an instance of ‘meta-regulation’.
135 Mantelero (n 45) 765 (discussing how ‘Data protection laws adopt general principles. . . and general clauses. . . which are used to introduce
non-legal social values into the legal framework’).
136 Mantelero (n 45) 762–63; Wright and Raab (n 66) 615.
137 There is a growing field of scholarship devoted to ‘collective data protection.’ See Mantelero (n 45) 757, fn 21; Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi
and Bart van der Sloot (eds), Group Privacy: New Challenges of Data
Technologies (Cham, Springer International Publishing, 2017).
138 Reisman and others (n 46) 19.
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Our GDPR-specific analysis has implications for proposals
for AIAs generally. Our research into the GDPR’s version
of an AIA suggests that the proposals discussed above
have largely missed several important observations.
First, AIAs are not best understood as a stand-alone
mechanism. In the context of the GDPR, they are one
part of a much larger system of governance.130 Only one
author among the above—Katyal—considers how impact assessments interact with other tools in the regulatory toolkit (discussing the concurrent need for
whistleblower protection and exemptions from trade secrecy law).131 In the context of the GDPR, both
Edwards and Veale and Casey and others point to the
DPIA’s role in algorithmic accountability, but do not
discuss at length its relationship to other accountability
tools in the GDPR.132 Our analysis suggests that impact
assessments are just one tool in a larger regulatory ecosystem, and may work best when they are not deployed
alone and are instead understood as entwined with
other regulatory tools such as individual rights.
Secondly, impact assessments can serve as a connection
between collaborative governance and individual rights.133
The information a company creates during the impact assessment process can feed into what it provides to individuals and to the public at large. The procedures an impact
assessment puts in place can serve not just to prevent error, bias, and discrimination, but also to legitimize a system or even respect an individual’s dignity within it. This
dual role is exemplified by the GDPR’s DPIA. In the
GDPR context, we found one author, Binns, who identified that the GDPR’s version of impact assessments is a
kind of collaborative governance with the private sector
(or what he identifies as ‘meta-regulation’).134 Binns, however, did not examine how the DPIA connects to the
broader system of both collaborative governance tools and
individual rights in the GDPR.
Thirdly, as part of a larger system of governance,
there are unexplored connections between the GDPR’s
DPIA and its underlying substantive individual rights
and substantive principles. It is true that many of the
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Towards a model AIA: producing
multi-layered explanations

Elements of a model AIA
A model AIA process should do at least the following. It
should contemplate the involvement of civil society as a
form of underused oversight. It should better involve and
engage impacted individuals, not just through surveys but
through representative boards, before an algorithm is
deployed. It should contemplate requiring companies, or
regulators, to help fund the involvement of both of the
above and provide technical expertise or the resources for
obtaining technical expertise. It should involve not just external technical experts, but external experts in law and
ethics to help define, or at least frame discussions of, what
we mean by terms like ‘discrimination’ or ‘bias’.139
A model AIA process should also deliberately widen
the lens from algorithms as a technology in isolation, to
algorithms as systems embedded in human systems—
both those who design the technology and those who
use it.140 There is a growing awareness that addressing
139 For example, the COMPAS recidivism risk assessment algorithm led to a
significant public discussion over different ways of defining discrimination. Julia Angwin and others, ‘Machine Bias’ (Propublica, 23 May 2016)
<https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-incriminal-sentencing> accessed 8 October 2020 (describing leading risk
assessment tools forsentencing and corrections developed by
Northpointe); Sam Corbett-Davies others, ‘A Computer Program Used
for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s
Actually Not that Clear’ The Washington Post (17 October 2016)
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/
can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautiousthanpropublicas> accessed 8 October 2020.
140 See Andrew D Selbst and others, ‘Fairness and Abstraction in
Sociotechnical Systems’ in Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness,
Accountability, and Transparency, FAT* ’19 (New York, NY, USA: ACM,

139

problems of unfairness or bias in the technology in the
abstract will be inadequate for mitigating these problems when an algorithm is implemented in practice.
The risks come from the technology by itself, and from
the humans who embed their values into the technology
during its construction and training. Additionally, risks
arise from how the humans using the algorithm are
trained and constrained, or not constrained, in their use
of it.141 A model AIA should thus be truly continuous: a
process that produces outputs or reports, but also
includes ongoing assessment and performance evaluation, especially for those algorithms that change quickly
over time and are deployed in multiple contexts.
Substantively, a model AIA could take advantage of
the fact that it is conducted on a system-wide level to
search for, and mitigate, social harms that go beyond
impacted individuals.142 For example, a model AIA
could be used to root out discrimination not just
against particular individuals but against marginalized
communities, identifying discrimination patterns that
would be impossible to find through individual disclosures alone.143 A model AIA could explicitly require an
assessment of performance metrics, on a system-wide
and ongoing basis, and require disclosure of these metrics to external experts.144 This would not stretch the
purpose of the DPIA—at least one application of which
explicitly focuses on collective surveillance in the context of monitoring public spaces—and would fill an
existing gap in the GDPR’s current algorithmic accountability and disclosure regime.145
As to substantive risk-mitigation measures, different
data controllers may have different duties. Article 24(1)
of the GDPR states that taking into account the nature,
scope, context, and risks of data processing, the controller shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance with the GDPR.
Accordingly, algorithmic decision-making involving
bigger risks for data subjects should entail more safeguards. As discussed, data controllers to a certain extent
choose their own algorithmic accountability safeguards:

141
142

143

144
145

2019) 59–68 <https://doi.org/10.1145/3287560.3287598>accessed 8
October 2020.
Ibid 61 on COMPAS Case.
Mantelero (n 45) passim; L Edwards, D McAuley and L Diver, ‘From
Privacy Impact Assessment to Social Impact Assessment’ in 2016 IEEE
Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) (2016) 53–57 <https://doi.org/10.
1109/SPW.2016.19> accessed 8 October 2020; Wright and Raab (n 66)
613–26; Raab and Wright (n 99).
Reisman and others (n 46) 18; see also Pauline Kim, ‘Auditing
Algorithms for Discrimination’ (2017) 166(1) University of Pennsylvania
Law Review Online 196.
Edwards and Veale (n 3) 80.
Reisman and others (n 46) 8. Edwards and Veale (n 3) 80.
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We close with a framework for a model AIA under the
GDPR. More research is clearly needed in both the technological and policy space to implement this in practice.
But we hope to start that conversation here. Our envisioned model AIA is informed both by our understanding of the GDPR and by our overview of impact
assessment proposals above. Like previous AIA proposals, we emphasize stakeholder input, expert oversight, and public disclosure as essential elements of an
effective impact assessment. Unlike previous AIA proposals, we deploy our understanding of the GDPR to
suggest how the DPIA process informs and connects
into the GDPR’s system of individual rights, through
disclosures that we refer to as multi-layered explanations.
Thus, our conclusions inform not only the ongoing policy discussion of impact assessments, but the ongoing
debate about individual algorithmic transparency rights
in the GDPR.
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Comparing DPIA requirements with
algorithmic accountability requirements under
the GDPR
The more granular but nonetheless central insight arising
from our research is this: the DPIA process can and should
inform the substance of the GDPR’s individual algorithmic
accountability rights. That is, when we take a close look at
the substance a company or public agency is required to
produce during a DPIA, it maps surprisingly well on to the
disclosure requirements of the GDPR.
Article 35(7) GDPR requires that a DPIA should
contain:
1. a systematic description of the envisaged processing
operations and the purposes of the processing, (. . .)
2. an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of
the processing operations in relation to the purposes
146 Article 29 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (n 35) 22.

3. an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms
of data subjects (. . .); and the measures envisaged to
address the risks, including safeguards, security
measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection
of personal data and to demonstrate compliance
with this Regulation taking into account the rights
and legitimate interests of data subjects and other
persons concerned.
This required content of a DPIA largely maps onto the
GDPR’s individual algorithmic transparency rights. For example, where Article 35(7) requires a DPIA to contain a
‘systematic description of the envisaged processing operations’, this could be used as the foundation for the GDPR’s
disclosure requirement that individuals must be informed
of ‘meaningful information about the logic involved’ in algorithmic processing. The Guidelines on DPIAs interpret
the systematic description to include: the nature, scope, context, and purposes of the processing; categories of personal
data, recipients, and storage; and a functional description
of the processing operation and the assets on which personal data rely.146 Any or all of this systematic description
of processing produced during a DPIA could feed into
what is disclosed to individuals regarding ‘meaningful information about the logic involved’.
If we compare the GDPR’s transparency requirements
for ADM with this and other substantive requirements for
DPIAs, the similarities are striking (see Table 1).
The Guidelines on ADM only make these parallels
more apparent. The Guidelines on ADM once again
echo the substantive requirements of a DPIA (Table 2).
That is, there are numerous similarities between information that a data controller is required to produce during
a DPIA and what a data controller is required to release to
individuals as part of the GDPR’s algorithmic transparency
duties. The data controller’s duty to systematically describe
the processing operations in a DPIA is similar to the algorithmic transparency duty to clarify the categories of personal data used in ADM and how algorithmic profiling is
built. The controller’s duty to assess the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in a DPIA is similar to the algorithmic transparency duty to explain the
pertinency of personal data used and the relevance of the
profiling. The controller’s duty to assess the data processing
risks and impacts on individuals is similar to the transparency duty to explain the impact of the profiling use in
ADM. Lastly, the controller’s duty to establish safeguards
of individual rights in the case of ADM is similar to the
duty to find and describe measures envisaged to address
the risks in DPIA.
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some are required in the GDPR both at Article 22(3)
and at Recital 71 (algorithmic auditing, the rights to
contest, to have a new decision, to a human in the loop,
and to explanation), but these are not closed lists, and
the Guidelines on ADM suggest additional techniques.
In the case of more intrusive and riskier ADM processes, the data controller should and likely will implement all possible safeguards, including a right to
explanation of an individual decision.
To make the Impact Assessment process meaningful,
Data Protection Authorities must be willing to spot check
and enforce against captured versions of it. While the
GDPR does not require regulatory involvement in all
DPIAs, DPAs could use the GDPR’s broad informationforcing powers to inspect particular companies and check
for compliance. This spot-checking might work not just to
monitor and improve the efficacy of the process, but to
identify substantive problems with algorithmic decisionmaking. DPAs might over time use what they have learned
to establish more concrete best practices or support the establishment of sector-specific codes of conducts around algorithmic fairness, as suggested in the Guidelines on ADM.
Several implementing Member States have already put in
place substantive backstops around algorithmic decisionmaking, prohibiting decision-making based on particular
factors, or that is discriminatory or biased. Slovenia, as
mentioned, couples this substantive prohibition against
discrimination with a required impact assessment process.
This dual approach of linking impact assessments to substantive prohibitions may help to tether internal company
risk mitigation measures to the public good.
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Table 1. Comparison between DPIA duties and GDPR algorithmic accountability duties under the GDPR
Transparency rights about Automated Decision-Making
(Articles 13–15, 22)

Systematic description of data processing

Meaningful information about the logic involved
(Articles 13(2)(f); 14(2)(g); 15(1)(h))
Meaningful information about the significance (Articles
13(2)(f); 14(2)(g); 15(1)(h))
Meaningful information about the envisaged effects of
the algorithm (Articles 13(2)(f); 14(2)(g); 15(1)(h))
Appropriate safeguards, including the right to
contestation, individual explanation, human
intervention (Article 22(3) and Recital 71)

Assessing necessity and proportionality of data
processing
Assessing risks to fundamental rights and freedoms
Mitigating those risks through appropriate measures

In other words, in the case of ADM, the outputs of
the DPIA process described in the GDPR appear to correspond to algorithmic transparency duties in the
GDPR (as interpreted by Article 29 Working Party
(now the EDPB)).

Towards multi-layered explanations from an algorithmic DPIA
Our perspective on the DPIA as linking systemic governance to individual rights thus has implications for the
GDPR’s overall approach to algorithmic explanations.
The DPIA process in our view suggests what we call
‘multi-layered explanations’ for ADM. These explanations will likely be crafted as part of the DPIA process
and should be released either directly to the public or to
affected individuals.
We are not the first to observe that there are multiple
layers of explanations of algorithmic decision-making
required in the GDPR.147 These stem from the GDPR’s
two types of individual transparency requirements, articulated in Articles 13, 14, and 15 on individual notice
and access, and its algorithm-specific provisions in
Article 22. Edwards and Veale in particular have suggested
that individuals subject to algorithmic decision-making
should be provided both of what they call ‘model-centric’
and
‘subject-centric’
explanations.148Model-centric
147 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi (n 2) 78; Selbst and Powles (n 2) 241;
Edwards and Veale (n 3) 52ff. See also European Commission’s High
Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for
Thrustworthy AI, 15 <https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-con
sultation/guidelines> accessed 8 October 2020(‘The degree to which
explicability is needed is highly dependent on the context and the severity
of the consequences if that output is erroneous or otherwise inaccurate’).
148 Edwards and Veale (n 3) 22. They helpfully add to the conversation
about the kinds of explanations that could be provided: (i) model-centric
explanations that disclose, for example, the family of model, input data,
performance metrics, and how the model was tested; and (ii) subject-centric explanations that disclose, for example, not just counterfactuals

explanations, they suggest, should include: the family of
model, input data, performance metrics, and how a model
was tested. Subject-centric explanations should include
counterfactuals (that is, what changes would change the
outcome of an individual decision), the characteristics of
similarly classified individuals, and the confidence a system
has in an outcome.149
With our perspective on the GDPR’s two-pronged
approach to algorithmic accountability, and our emphasis on the role of the DPIA, we understand there to
be more layers: individual explanations, group explanations, and systemic explanations, both internal and external. And unlike Edwards and Veale, we have more
optimism that these multi-layer explanations can be
grounded either in the text or subtext of the GDPR.
Looking at the GDPR through the lens of individual
rights reveals the by-now-familiar two layers of explanations: a right to an explanation of the model, and a right
to an individual explanation of an individual decision.
The GDPR requires disclosure to individuals of ‘meaningful information about the logic involved’ in ADM on
a systemic level.150 It also establishes, we believe, the
right to individual explanation of an individual
decision.151

(what would I have to do differently to change the decision?) but the
characteristics of others similarly classified, and the confidence the system has in a particular individual outcome.
149 See also Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Chris Russell,
‘Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box:
Automated Decisions and the GDPR’ (2018) Harvard Journal of Law &
Technology, ArXiv:1711.00399 [Cs], 1 November 2017, <http://arxiv.org/
abs/1711.00399> accessed 8 October 2020.
150 Arts 13 and 14 GDPR. See also Selbst and Powles (n 2) 241–42, discussing how this blends individualized and systemic explanations.
151 Kaminski (n 2) 199; Malgieri and Comandé (n 2) 246.
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Table 2:. Comparison between DPIA duties and the WP29 Guidelines on GDPR algorithmic accountability duties
Content of DPIA (Article35(7)) GDPR

2. An assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the
processing operations in relation to the purposes.
3. An assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of
data subjects referred to in paragraph 1.

Describing:
a. The categories of data used
c. How any profile used in the automated decision-making
process is built, including any statistics used in the
analysis;
b. Why the categories of data are pertinent
d. Why this profile is relevant to the automated decisionmaking process;
e. How it is used for a decision concerning the data
subject:
 ie which kinds of legal or similarly significant effects
under Article 22(1

4. The measures envisaged to address the risks, including
safeguards, security measures, and mechanisms to
ensure the protection of personal data and to
demonstrate compliance with this Regulation taking
into account the rights and legitimate interests of data
subjects and other persons concerned.

Which safeguards are adopted in compliance with Article
22(3) and (4):
 eg Contestation, human involvement, making
representation, explanation, algorithm audit, etc.

Looking through the lens of understanding the DPIA
as a nexus between systemic governance and individual
rights, however, reveals something more. The DPIA
process entails a whole web of explanations: to internal
oversight bodies ranging from the DPO to internal
auditors, to external third parties such as auditors and
expert boards, and as part of the overall assessment process.152 These explanations are of differing degrees of
breadth, depth, and technological complexity. But they
establish a complex system of information flows, beyond the individual transparency requirements of the
GDPR. These information flows will often require intermediation—that is, explanation—not just disclosure of
existing information.153 As discussed above, these various disclosures and explanations likely will include not
just systemic and individual analysis, but group-level
analysis of how an algorithm might impact particular
classes of individuals, or particular locations. Thus, the
DPIA process may address some of the concerns some
scholars have about the DPIA’s focus on individual
rights, to the exclusion of groups.
Whether these explanations will go beyond the doors
of companies is a different question. As discussed, a

DPIA is not required to be made public, but its public
disclosure is highly recommended, at least in the form
of meaningful summaries.154 We believe that analysis of
how algorithms impact particular groups or places
should be included in these public disclosures. This will
help drive policy conversations in the way anticipated
by most calls for public disclosure of impact assessments. It will also go some of the way to addressing concerns about a lack of stakeholder involvement and
regulatory oversight over the impact assessment process,
though we also counsel that companies aware of
impacts on particular places or groups should seek out
impacted individuals at an earlier stage of the process.
Moreover, there may be an argument for the disclosure of group- or location-based explanations to individuals as part of the GDPR’s individual transparency
rights regime. That is, even if DPIAs are not required to
be made public, and even if companies decide not to
disclose to the public what they discover about the impact of algorithmic decision-making on particular
groups, they may nonetheless have to do so to impacted
individuals under Article 22.

152 Margot E Kaminski, ‘Understanding Transparency in Algorithmic
Accountability’ in Woodrow Barfield (ed), Cambridge Handbook of the
Law of Algorithms (CUP 2020, forthcoming).

153 Frank Pasquale, ‘Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for
Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries’ (2010) 104(1)
Northwestern University Law Review 105–74.
154 Article 29 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (n 35) 17.
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1. A systematic description of the envisaged processing
operations and the purposes of the processing,
including, where applicable, the legitimate interest
pursued by the controller.

GDPR algorithmic accountability disclosure duties
Articles 13–15, 22 (Guidelines on ADM, 30)
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proportionality of eventual automated decisions taken
(Article 35(7)(d)). This may constitute a form of justification for data use and profiling mechanisms. Similarly,
the Guidelines on ADM recommend that data controllers (in order to comply with Articles 13–15) explain the
pertinence of categories of data used and the relevance
of the profiling mechanism.158 Assessing whether the
data used are pertinent and the profile is relevant for a
decision, as well as assessing the necessity and proportionality of the data processing in an ADM system,
seems to constitute a type of justification of automated
decision systems. The purpose of such assessment is not
just transparency about the technology and its processes, but an explanation about the lawfulness, fairness,
and legitimacy of certain decisions.159
Combining the algorithmic DPIA process and the
duty to disclose information about algorithmic decisions in coordinated actions would be beneficial not
just for individuals but for data controllers.160
Combining these tasks could benefit data controllers
because:

155 Art 22 GDPR.
156 Ramamurthy and others (n 17).
157 Sandra Wachter and Brent Mittelstadt, ‘A Right to Reasonable
Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and
AI’ (2019) 2019(2) Columbia Business Law Review <https://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract¼3248829> accessed 8 October 2020; Kaminski (n 5),
‘Binary Governance’, 12–17.
158 See Article 29 Working Party, Opinion on Automated Individual
Decision-Making, Annex, 30.
159 About the difference between explanation and justification see Mireille
Hildebrandt, Law for Computer Scientists and Other Folk (Oxford, New
York: OUP 2020) 301.

160 On the list of positive externalities for data controller if they disclose a
‘legibility’ test on algorithms, see Malgieri and Comandé (n 2) 259–60.
161 See Article 29 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (n 35)
17. See also Kloza and others (n 38) 2.
162 Veale, Binns, and Ausloos (n 63) 117–18.
163 See Art 22(3) and Recital 71. See also Roig (n 3).
164 See on the importance of continuous engagement of involved subject in
PIA: Roger Clarke, ‘An Evaluation of Privacy Impact Assessment
Guidance Documents’ (2011) 1(2) International Data Privacy Law 112.

1. they could optimize efforts that would otherwise be
spent on two different tasks (the DPIA and disclosure requirements) by taking compliance with DPIA
duties (Article 35) and feeding them into transparency duties as imposed by Article 13–15 (and 22) of
the GDPR;
2. publicly disclosing (at least some parts) of the DPIA
as a basis for explaining automated decisions is considered a best practice recommended in the DPIA
framework,161 in line with the data protection by design principle (Article 25 GDPR);162
3. disclosing information about algorithmic data
processing to data subjects and collecting their reactions (through, eg the right to contest, to have a new
decision, to have human involvement, etc.)163 could
be considered compliant with the duty to seek the
view of impacted data subjects (Article 35(9)
GDPR), in the continuous cycle of the DPIA
framework;164
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We understand the GDPR to suggest a connection
between required DPIA analysis of systemic risks of unfairness and discrimination, and the individual rights to
contestation, to express one’s view, and to human intervention.155 That is, for a person to be able to effectively
invoke her right to contest an algorithmic decision, she
may need to know whether she is being treated similarly
to or differently from other similarly situated individuals. For the GDPR’s series of individual rights to be
meaningful, individuals need to know not just information about a particular stand-alone decision, but information about the algorithm’s treatment of groups, and
tendency towards bias and discrimination.
This group-based explanation, which we argue can
be at least implied from—if not required by—the rights
to contestation or to challenge the decision, could be
created based on information on affinity or group profiling uncovered during a DPIA. This should not be
hard to implement. In technological terms, multilayered explanations based on general (or global),
group, and individual (or local) explanation are already
a reality.156
Finally, some scholars have remarked that what is
needed is not merely an explanation, but a legal justification of automated decisions taken.157 The full concept
of justification is not easy to address in the data protection framework and is beyond the scope of this article.
For the limited scope of this article, however, justifying
a decision means not merely explaining the logic and
reasoning behind it, but also explaining why it is a correct, lawful, and fair decision, ie that the decision is
based on proportional and necessary data processing,
using pertinent categories of data and relevant profiling
mechanisms.
Again, connecting the DPIA to transparency requirements may clarify what this could mean. Language
about the DPIA process suggests that in addition to
technical explanations of a model, data controllers
should produce justificatory explanations of a system
during a DPIA. Under the DPIA process, data controllers must prove the legal proportionality and necessity
of the data processing, and thus the legal necessity and
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The idea of at least partially merging algorithmic accountability duties with the DPIA process also seems
useful considering the most advanced literature on
explanations. As discussed above, a multi-layered and
multi-step explanation would be a continuous process,
not merely a product.168

Conclusion
There is a growing literature suggesting that AIAs are a
crucial tool in establishing algorithmic accountability.
This paper addresses that tool as it is implemented in
the GDPR. We find that the GDPR’s version of an AIA

165 About the link between ‘risks to rights and freedoms’ and impacts on
individuals, see Niels van Dijk, Raphaël Gellert and Kjetil Rommetveit,
‘A Risk to a Right? Beyond Data Protection Risk Assessments’ (2016)
32(2) Computer Law & Security Review 304; See also Katerina
Demetzou, ‘Data Protection Impact Assessment: A Tool for
Accountability and the Unclarified Concept of ‘High Risk’ in the General
Data Protection Regulation’ (2019) Computer Law & Security Review
105342 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2019.105342>.

serves as a central connection between its two
approaches to regulating algorithms: individual rights
and systemic governance. That framing allowed us to
identify both value in and shortcomings of the GDPR’s
Impact Assessment regime as applied to algorithmic
governance.
This analysis, we hope, will have value for other discussions of AIAs beyond the GDPR. In particular, moving
from individual transparency rights and governance accountability duties in the field of ADM, we suggest a
model of multi-layered explanations drawn from an impact assessment process. Since there are several layers of algorithmic explanation required by the GDPR, we
recommend that data controllers disclose a relevant summary of a system, produced in the DPIA process, as a first
layer of algorithmic explanation, to be followed by group
explanations and more granular, individualized explanations. More research is needed, in particular about how
different layers of explanations—systemic explanations,
group explanations, and individual explanations—can interact each other, and how technical tools can help in developing an AIA that might be re-used towards GDPRcomplying explanations and disclosures.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipaa020
Advance Access Publication 6 December 2020

166 Hildebrandt (n 19) passim.
167 Edwards and Veale (n 3) 65.
168 Tania Lombrozo, ‘The Structure and Function of Explanations’ (2006)
10(10) Trends in Cognitive Sciences 464–70. See also Tim Miller,
‘Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences’
(2019) 267 Artificial Intelligence 6, 273 who explains that explanation
has two processes: cognitive process and social process.
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4. in general terms, the dynamic merging of an algorithmic DPIA with multi-layered explanations might
be a ‘suitable safeguard’ to protect fundamental
rights and freedoms of individuals both under
Article 22(3) and under Article 35(7)(d) of the
GDPR;165
5. developing an algorithmic DPIA and explanation
safeguards in parallel (intrinsically related to the
right to contest a decision, right to a human-in-theloop, etc.) might be the best way to enrich transparency with accountability safeguards166 and overcome
the ‘transparency fallacy’ through a virtuous cycle of
algorithmic auditing and continuous detection/mitigation of unfair effects.167
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